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Is it Time for the Restatement of Contracts, Fourth? 
Peter A. Alces* and Chris Byrne** 
With the failure of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) Article 2 Re-
vision project, it is time to consider whether it is time for the Restatement of 
Contracts, Fourth. The First Restatement of Contracts, largely the work of 
Samuel Williston, 1 endeavored to formulate the contract law as it had 
evolved through the time of its promulgation. The second restatement of 
contracts was really Article 2 of the U.C.C., promulgated first in 1951 2 and 
then finally enacted in the states by 1967. 3 The Restatement of Contracts, 
Second (which really was the third restatement of contracts), began in 1964, 
was completed in 1979 and imported many of the U.C.C. Article 2 principles 
to the contract law generally. After a relatively lengthy period of stasis, 
well, relative stasis, work began on revision of Article 2 and continued for 
more than a decade. The work was largely futile, though, as Revised Article 
2 has yet to be enacted in a single state. 
So here we are: the "current" Restatement is about thirty years old and we 
know that the keepers of the commercial contracting flame question its vi-
brancy (why else spend more than a decade on new commercial contracting 
legislation that would depart from the model (Article 2) for the last Restate-
ment). It may be that it is difficult to make the case for Restatements of 
Contract and that all of the "action," such as it is, will be in the form of pie-
cemeal initiatives that focus on discrete, or at least divisible, contracting 
contexts. 4 However, it would seem that if it is time for a new Article 2, or 
for Principles of Software Contracting, then it is also (or instead) time for a 
new Restatement of Contracts. Conversely, if it is not time for a new Con-
tracts Restatement, then it may not be time for either a new Article 2 or for 
Principles of any type of contracting. 
• Rita Anne Rollins Professor of Law, The College of William and Mary School of Law. The 
authors are grateful to Mark R. Wylie, J.D. 2009, Washington University- St. Louis School of Law, for 
invaluable research assistance. 
•• Head of Research and Instructional Services, Wolf Law Library, The College of William and 
Mary School of Law. 
I. Arthur L. Corbin, Samuel Williston, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1327, 1327-28 (1963). 
2. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, A Few Facts About the 
Amendments to U.C.C. Articles 2 and 2A, 
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_ factsheets./uniformacts-fs-ucc22A03 .asp (last visited January 
16, 2009). 
3. MARION W . BENFIELD, JR. & MICHAEL M . GREENFIELD, SALES: CASES AND MATERIALS 5 
(2006) (noting that every state but Louisiana had adopted the U.C.C. by 1967). 
4. See, e.g., American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Software Contracts (Tentative Draft 
No. 1 March 24, 2008). 
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To consider those arguments, it is worthwhile to reflect on the relationship 
between the Contracts Restatement projects and the Uniform Commercial 
Code. And, it should not be assumed that the Restatement projects remain 
vital at all. It just may be that the time for the Contracts Restatements, at 
least as we have known them, has passed. And if that is true, then the ur-
gency of new commercial legislation, not Restatements or Statements of 
Principles, is manifest. In this brief essay we shall consider the fit between 
products of the American Law Institute (the "ALI") and commercial legisla-
tion (a fit one of us first considered with Marion Benfield several years ago5) 
and suggest that perhaps the Restatement movement and (or?) the compre-
hensive commercial legislation movement may be dead. It will be necessary 
to describe the mechanics of the American Law Institute and National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgation processes in 
order to reach any worthwhile conclusions about the future. That presenta-
tion will support conclusions about the nature of the work the ALI should 
do to make sense of the contract law generally, and the commercial contract-
ing law more specifically. 
I. THE MECHANICS OF PROMULGATION 
Born during the progressive era, both the ALI and the National Confe-
rence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) have proven to 
be two of the most influential legal institutions in the United States. Each 
organization has been essential in improving the administration of law 
through efforts to simplify the law by distilling its best principles and mak-
ing its application uniform throughout the states. The ALI has done most of 
this simplification through their Restatements of law, while NCCUSL has 
accomplished the same through uniform laws. 
A Restatement "is a synthesis of the evolving law in a specific subject that 
is cast in a form similar to legislative rules."6 A Restatement primarily in-
volves the common law, but can include statutory law. A uniform law is 
statutory law that state legislatures are encouraged to adopt, without 
amendment, to promote the uniformity of state law. The ALI often will 
partner with NCCUSL to create statutory schemes such as the Uniform 
Commercial Code. Courts choose whether they will adopt a particular Res-
tatement and state legislatures do the same for uniform laws. Some Res-
tatements and uniform laws have gained widespread adoption; others have 
not been as successful. 
NCCUSL was created first. In 1889, the American Bar Association rec-
ommended that each state appoint commissioners to meet and discuss the 
5. Marion W. Benfield, Jr. & Peter A Alces, Reinventing the Wheel, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 
1405 (1994) (hereinafter Benfield, Jr. & Alces, Reinventing). 
6. Geoffrey Hazard, The American Law Institute Is Alive and Well, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 661, 662 
(1998). 
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creation of uniform laws. The first meeting of NCCUSL occurred in 1892, 
and by 1912 every state had appointed commissioners. The primary purpose 
ofNCCUSL is to promote uniformity and clarity in state statutory law. 7 
The ALI was the final product of a committee of prominent lawyers, 
judges, and law school professors who met to create a juristic center. 
Chaired by Elihu Root, the former Secretary of State during President Theo-
dore Roosevelt's administration, the committee consisted of such luminaries 
as Benjamin Cardozo, Learned Hand, Roscoe Pound, Arthur Corbin, Samuel 
Williston, and John Wigmore. A report the committee presented to a meet-
ing of judges, lawyers, and law school professors in 1923 recommended the 
establishment of the American Law Institute. 8 
The founders of the ALI envisioned an organization that would improve 
and simplify the common law by eliminating its "uncertainty and complexi-
ty. "9 According to the 1923 report, no other legal organization possessed the 
qualities necessary for the job. 10 It is unlikely that the ALI's founders fore-
saw the organization's involvement in drafting model codes because 
NCCUSL had been doing just that for over thirty years by the time of the 
ALI's creation. 
The ALI founders viewed the Restatements as the best "principles of law" 
distilled from existing common law and, in certain cases, statutory law. 11 
The Restatements, although drafted in a code-like manner, were intended to 
be adopted by courts, not legislatures. The committee believed that statutes 
did not have the flexibility of the common law or the common law's ability 
to be fleshed out over time through court decisions. 12 Therefore, they re-
garded the nascent organization's purpose to be the promotion of uniformity 
in the common law. 
However, within two years of its birth, the ALI became involved in draft-
ing a model code. In 1924, the ALI began investigating the need for a Res-
tatement of substantive and procedural criminal law. A report to the ALI 
Council recommended that state substantive criminal law be restated, but 
cautioned against restating the law of criminal procedure because criminal 
procedure is primarily statutory in nature, rather than common law. 13 
7. John McClaugherty, The Uniform Law Process: Lessons for a New Millennium, 27 OKLA. CITY 
U. L. REv. 535,536 (2002); http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=O&taid=ll. 
8. ALI, 1923 Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for 
Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an American Law Institute (1923) (hereinafter 
ALI, 1923 Report), reprinted in ALI, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 50TH ANNIVERSARY (1973), p. 15. 
9. /d. at 15. 
10. /d. at 40. 
II. /d. at 26. 
12. See /d. at 29-31. 
13. ALI, Report to the Council by the Committee on a Survey and Statement of the Defects in Crimi-
nal Justice, at 51 , 54 (April 1925). The report noted that "the institute was founded and its present funds 
[were] secured primarily to make a restatement of the common law." One might ask why substantive law 
would be a more appropriate subject for a restatement when most states at the time had criminal codes. 
The report reasoned that, even in states with criminal codes, many questions of criminal law were still 
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The ALI abandoned, for the time being, their attempt to restate substan-
tive criminal law, but did agree to draft a model code of criminal procedure 
after the American Bar Association, the Association of American Law 
Schools, and the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology re-
quested that it do so. 14 The ALI Council justified its involvement in code 
drafting by asserting that any organization undertaking such work needed to 
be composed of"leading representatives, from all parts of the country, of the 
bench, the bar, and the principal law schools." 15 The fact that the ALI was 
such an organization made "it practically impossible to form another asso-
ciation made up of essentially the same personnel." 16 Therefore, the Council 
reasoned that the ALI was the only organization that could undertake such 
work, a result that was not "foreseen when the Institute was created." 17 
The ALI Council believed that drafting model codes required the same 
drafting procedures used for creating Restatements and, therefore, would 
place no additional administrative burden on the ALI. In fact, the Council 
predicted that, unlike the lengthy process of drafting Restatements, a model 
code of criminal procedure could be completed in a much shorter length of 
time: three years. 18 The code was actually completed in 1930, after six years 
ofwork. 19 
Thus, for over fifty years, the Institute focused on two types of projects: 
model laws directed at legislatures, and Restatements of law aimed at the 
courts. In 1977, it began work on a third type of project, a Principles of Law 
project. Neither fish nor fowl, Principles of Law projects may include model 
statute provisions, Restatement provisions, and rules on best practices. 
The first Principles of Law created by the American Law Institute was the 
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations. In 
the President's Foreword to that publication, Roswell B. Perkins described 
the genesis of the corporate governance project. According to Perkins, in 
1977 Herbert Wechsler, the Director of the ALI, presented to the Council his 
idea for an ALI project on corporate governance, recommending that an ad 
hoc advisory committee be created to consider the project. The committee's 
conclusions in support of a project were summarized in a report to the Coun-
cil by Wechsler. Four regional conferences were organized to consider the 
proposed project. According to Wechsler, the legal professionals at the con-
decided by courts using common law that was both inconsistent and uncertain. It was these common law 
principles that the Institute aspired to improve. 
14. 3rd ALI Proc. 59 (1925). The ALI did begin the drafting process for a Model Penal Code in 
1950. ALI, Past and Present ALI Projects (2007), http://www.ali.orgfdoc/past_present_ALiprojects.pdf. 
15. 3rd ALI Proc. 59 (1925). 
16. /d. 
17. /d. Interestingly, the Council minutes did not mention NCCUSL. 
18. /d. at 59-60. 
19. ALI, Past and Present ALI Projects (2007), 
http://www.ali.org/doc/past _present_ ALiprojects.pdf. 
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ferences indicated their support for a Restatement and recommendations for 
improvement in prevailing business governance law and practice. 20 
The Council then invited Ray Garrett, Jr., former Chairman of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, to define such a project. Garrett recom-
mended that the project should consist of a Restatement of existing case law 
on corporate management and control with recommendations for corporate 
practices and statutory provisions. He envisioned the project as extending 
beyond Restatement treatment: 
Where there is no judicial authority, or where the cases are unsatisfac-
tory by modem standards either because of their antiquity, or the ab-
sence of compelling analysis, or because today they just seem wrong-
resort must be had to other sources. These may include the literature on 
the subject, the better corporate practice in the view of those expe-
rienced in the field, not limited to lawyers, and ultimately the judgment 
of the Institute, aided by the Reporter and his Advisers. Where the 
Project is not in fact restating the cases, the Institute's views should 
take the form of recommendations which may include recommended 
statutory provisions, state or federal. 21 
The council authorized the president of the ALI to proceed with the 
project in 1978. Garrett and others concluded early on in the development of 
the project that corporate law could only be reformed effectively by includ-
ing model statutes, restatements of case law, and recommended corporate 
practices. 22 The initial title of the project, Principles of Corporate Gover-
nance and Structure: Restatement and Recommendations, drew criticism 
from those who thought the term "Restatement" was misleading because the 
project also encompassed recommendations of better corporate practices and 
statutory provisions. Accordingly, the title was changed to Principles of 
Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations. 23 
Although the name change may have better reflected the nature of this 
new, hybrid project, the criticism remained that judges and attorneys would 
20. Roswell B. Perkins, President's Foreword to I American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate 
Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, xi, xvi-xviii (1994). 
21. /d. at xix, (citing The Garrett Memorandum addressing the subject of "A Restatement with 
Recommendations Regarding the Legal Duties Incident to Corporate Management and Control.")(May 
13, 1978). Garrett was not alone in his recommendation that corporate law could not be adequately 
restated in its entirety. Professor Louis Loss also believed that although some parts of corporate law 
could be restated, others controlled by statute or corporate practices needed model code provisions and 
recommended guidelines. Donald E. Schwartz, Genesis: Panel Response, 8 CARDOZO L. REv. 687, 688 
(1987) (citing Loss, Concluding Remarks, in COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND 
GoVERNANCE 553, 554 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979)). 
22. See supra note 10; and Melvin Eisenberg, An Introduction to the American Law Institute 's 
Corporate Governance Project, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 495,498 (1984); Eisenberg eta!., Panel Discus-
sion, 37 U. MIAMI L. REv. 319, 337 (1983) ("[C]orporation Law is a unique jurisprudential animal. 
Although most bodies of law are largely case or common law, or else are largely of statutory origin, 
corporation law is a hybrid."). Eisenberg was a reporter on the Corporate Governance Project. 
23 . Perkins, supra note 20, at xviii-xxi. 
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regard the Principles of Corporate Governance as having the same authorita-
tiveness as Restatements of existing law despite the fact that Principles could 
involve significant changes to existing law. For some critics, portraying the 
Principles as being like Restatements could mask the extent of their innova-
tion. 24 After having faced the initial criticisms to the Principles format, ALI 
presidents and directors have justified the use of that format in the introduc-
tions and forwards to the Principles of Law projects that have followed the 
Corporate Governance Project. 25 
Recent directors of the ALI, such as Geoffrey Hazard and Lance Liebman, 
have found Principles projects more appropriate than Restatements in situa-
tions where the law is unsettled or where a more fundamental revision of the 
law is needed, especially in legal areas governed by both statutes and the 
common law. 26 Hazard noted that family law could not be addressed with a 
Restatement because of"the current disarray in family law."27 Similar to the 
Principles on Corporate Governance, the ALI's Principles ofthe Law of 
Family Dissolution consists of a combination of Restatement provisions and 
modellaws.28 Using the Principles format allowed for recognition of new 
legal concepts and facilitated greater consistency in family law. 29 
Another statement regarding the appropriate scope of a Principles project 
is in Lance Liebman's Foreword to the Principles of the Law of Aggregate 
Litigation, Discussion Draft No. 2 (April 6, 2007). Liebman asserts that the 
law of aggregate litigation lends itself to a Principles project and not a Res-
24. Jonathan R. Macey. The Transformation of the American Law Institute, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 
1212, 1216-17 (1993). 
25. See Roswell B. Perkins, President's Foreword to I American Law Inst., Principles of Corporate 
Governance: Analysis and Recommendations (1994); Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, supra 
note 4, at Introduction; and Foreword to American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Aggregate 
Litigation (Discussion Draft No. 2 2007). The ALI web site, 
http://www.ali.org/doc/past_present_ALiprojects.pdf, currently lists 8 Principles of Law that it is in-
volved in: 
Aggregate Litigation (2003- ) 
Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations (1977-1994) 
Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations (1989-2002) 
Government Access to and Use of Personal Digital Information (2006-) 
Nonprofit Organizations (2000- ) 
Software Contracts (2004- ) 
Transnational Civil Procedure (1997-2006) 
World Trade Law: The World Trade Organization (2001-) 
26. The ALI used the same rationale four decades before the first Principles project, when it aban-
doned a Restatement project on evidence because the state laws of evidence were deemed highly unset-
tled and poor law, in need not of restating, but of a "thorough revision" through the creation of a model 
code. Am. Law Inst., Model Code of Evidence at viii (1942). 
27. ALI, Foreword to Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, 
at xiii (Proposed Final Draft, Part I 1997). See generally James DiFonzio, Toward a Unified Field 
Theory of the Family: The American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 2001 
BYU L. REV. 923 (2001). 
28. DiFonzio, supra note 27, at 924. 
29. June Carbone, The Futility of Coherence: The ALI's Principles of the Law of Family Law Disso-
lution, Compensatory Spousal Payments, 4 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 43 (2002). 
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tatement because current law varies among the states, as well as between the 
states and federal government. However, even with these differences, "re-
cent legal developments point in certain directions that can be sketched, pre-
dicted, and recommended."30 Given the current state of the law, Liebman 
believes that "appropriate recommendations should be aimed at legislatures 
and courts."31 According to Liebman, all of these conditions point to the use 
of a Principles project and not a Restatement. 
In his report to the Annual Meeting in 2006, Liebman notes the movement 
away from model codes to Principles of Laws. He regards it as a reaction to 
the state legislatures' failure to adopt ALI model codes. Liebman approves 
of the ALI's use of Principles of Law to speak to legislatures, courts, and 
agencies at the same time because the Principles format allows the reporter 
to build a coherent law out of existing statutes, regulations, and judicial rul-
ings, as well as relevant legal research. 32 
The unsettled nature of existing law has also served as a justification for a 
Principles project on the law of software contracts. The Introduction to the 
Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, Tentative Draft No. 1 (March 
24, 2008) explains that a Restatement treatment of the law "would be prema-
ture" because courts are still in the midst of deciding fundamental issues of 
software contracts. 33 A Principles project goes beyond restating the law by 
"account[ing] for case law and recommend[ing] best practices," allowing the 
law to adapt to future conditions. 34 Courts, if they decide to use the Prin-
ciples, can employ them as "definitive rules" or as an interpretation of exist-
ing common law or statutes. 35 
The ALI has no explicit guidelines to determine whether a project should 
be a Restatement, Principles of Law, or model code. The only written guid-
ance about the appropriate scope or topic for an ALI project is a reporter's 
handbook and the statements by ALI directors, presidents, and fellow report-
ers. This lack of guidance essentially means that the form of ALI projects is 
chosen in an ad hoc manner. 
The lack of guidance on the scope of projects does not correspond to a 
lack of process for the development of ALI projects. The ALI's Program 
Committee Charter, adopted in May 2007, states that the Director of the ALI 
must seek the "advice and recommendation" of the Program Committee 
30. ALI, Foreword to Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, at xiii (Discussion Draft No.2 
2007). 
31. Jd. 
32. REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, ANNUAL REPORTS, 83RD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE 1-3 (2006). See LIEBMAN, FOREWORD, CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE: A HANDBOOK FOR ALI REPORTERS AND THOSE WHO REVIEW THEIR WORK, AT vii (2005) 
("Principles do not purport to restate but rather pull together the fundamentals underlying statutory, 
judicial, and administrative law in a particular legal field and point the way to a coherent (a principled, if 
you will) future."). 
33 . Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, supra note 4, at 2. 
34. ld. 
35. Jd. at 3. 
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"[b ]efore submitting a proposal for a new Restatement, Principle, statutory, 
or other substantial law reform project to the Council or Executive Commit-
tee for its approval .... "36 In so doing, the Director should ordinarily pro-
vide, in advance to the Program Committee, a "prospectus that includes a 
description of the project's purpose, need, and scope, and the probable form 
of the final work product .... "(emphasis added)37 
The ALI's bylaws, as amended in May 2007, provide that the "primary 
functions of the Council are to determine projects, programs, and activities 
to be undertaken by the Institute, either alone or with other organizations; 
[and] to determine the form of Institute projects .... "(emphasis added)38 
Significantly, the phrase "determine the form of Institute projects" did not 
exist in the prior version of the bylaws. The prior version read, "[t]o deter-
mine projects, programs, and activities to be undertaken by the Institute, 
either alone or jointly with other organizations, including government agen-
cies .... " 39 
The charter and bylaws, taken together, outline a process in which the Di-
rector initiates a project by seeking its approval from the Council or Execu-
tive Committee after the project has been analyzed by the Program Commit-
tee. The Director indicates what form the project will take, presumably Res-
tatement, Principles, or model code. The Council can then approve the 
project and determine its final form. 
After the Council has approved the project, the Director selects a reporter 
and a group of ALI members to act as advisors on the project. The reporter, 
who is an expert in the area of law covered by the project, has the primary 
drafting responsibilities, while the advisors are also subject experts who pro-
vide the reporter with feedback and constructive criticism of the reporter's 
various drafts of the project. 
The reporter first creates a preliminary draft and meets with the project's 
advisors and a consultative group to receive feedback. The consultative 
group consists of ALI members who have an interest in the area of law under 
consideration and have volunteered to assist with the project. Although both 
the advisors and the consultative group can provide helpful analysis of the 
draft, the sole responsibility for drafting remains with the reporter. 
After revising the preliminary draft based on the comments received, the 
reporter produces a draft to be considered by the ALI Council. The reporter 
receives detailed feedback on this Council Draft. The Council, in contrast to 
the advisors or the consultative group, does have the authority to order the 
reporter to make changes to the draft. After incorporating any changes in-
36. http://www.ali.org/doc/Charter_Prograrn_Comm.pdf. 
37. /d. 
38. Bylaw 4.01(8). http://www.ali.org/doc/Bylaws07.pdf. 
39. Bylaw 4.0 I (A). http://www.ali.org/doclbylaw _ 2007.pdf. 
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itiated by the Council, a Tentative Draft is produced, which is presented to 
the ALI membership for approval. 40 
As noted previously, NCCUSL is a partner with the ALI on some statuto-
ry projects, including the U.C.C., and has a similar drafting process. The 
project is assigned to a drafting committee, members of which are appointed 
by the NCCUSL president. The drafting committee members bear primary 
responsibility for the drafting process. Unlike their central role in the ALI 
drafting process, the reporters in a drafting committee perform research and 
create a draft document of the proposed legislation using the language de-
veloped by committee members. 41 Outside advisors from the ALI and 
American Bar Association and other experts may also participate.42 Once a 
draft is completed, it is usually discussed during at least two NCCUSL an-
nual meetings before being promulgated. 43 
Joint ALI and NCCUSL projects must go through the approval process of 
each organization. The process differs slightly if the project involves 
amending the Uniform Commercial Code. ALI and NCCUSL have created 
the Permanent Editorial Board (the "Board") for the U.C.C. The Board is 
responsible for amendments to the U.C.C. The Board can suggest amend-
ments on its own, or a study committee from either the Conference or Insti-
tute can suggest amendments after consulting with the Board. If the Confe-
rence and Institute approve of a project to amend the U.C.C., then a joint 
drafting committee is appointed by both organizations. The reporter(s) for 
the drafting project are also jointly selected. Any draft produced is subject 
to the same approval process that any ALI project undergoes. Both organi-
zations must adopt the amendment before it can go into effect. 44 
NCCUSL produces both uniform laws and model acts. The main purpose 
of a uniform law is to promote the uniformity of law among the states. A 
model act can achieve its objectives without all states adopting it in its enti-
rety.45 NCCUSL has a process to determine whether a proposal should be a 
uniform law or a model act and criteria for making that determination: 
2. DESIGNATION OF ACTS AS UNIFORM OR MODEL 
(f) Criteria for designation: 
(i) An act shall be designated as "Uniform" if 
40. ALI, HANDBOOK, supra note 32, at 15-18. 
41. Carlyle C. Ring, The U.C.C. Process-Consensus and Balance, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 287, 288-
89 (1994). 
42. /d. at 290. 
43. /d. at 298. 
44. Agreement Describing tbe Relationship oftbe American Law Institute, the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and tbe Permanent Editorial Board witb Respect to tbe Uni-
form Commercial Code (July 31, 1986, as amended January 18, 1998), http://www.ali.org/doc/03-
PEB%20for"/o20UCC%2003.pdf. 
45. http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=5&tabid=61. 
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(A) there is a substantial reason to anticipate enact-
ment in a large number of jurisdictions; and 
(B) "uniformity" of the provisions of the proposed 
enactment among the various jurisdictions is a prin-
cipal objective. 
(ii) An act shall be designated as a "Uniform Law Commis-
sioners' Model" Act if 
(A) "uniformity" may be a desirable objective, al-
though not a principal objective; 
(B) the Act may promote uniformity and minimize di-
versity, even though a significant number of jurisdic-
tions may not adopt the Act in its entirety; or 
(C) the purposes of the Act can be substantially 
achieved, even though it is not adopted in its entirety 
by every State. 46 
Vol. 11 
In contrast, the ALI does not have written criteria for the ALI Director 
and council to apply when determining the form of a particular project. The 
ALI has published a reporter's handbook that sheds some light on the 
process in the following description: 
The nature, content, and scope of each Institute project are initially de-
veloped by its Reporter in consultation with the Institute's Director, 
generally on the basis of a prospectus or memorandum prepared by the 
Reporter at the invitation of the Director and subsequently reviewed by 
the Program Committee and either by the Council as a whole or its Ex-
ecutive Committee. 47 
According to the Handbook's formulation, "Restatements are addressed to 
courts and others applying existing law" and reflect current law, but "Prin-
ciples [are] addressed to courts, legislatures, or governmental agencies. " 48 
They express "the law as it should be," and not necessarily how the law cur-
rently is. 49 The ALI, on its website, differentiates among Restatements, 
model laws, and Principles of Law as follows: 
Restatements are addressed to courts and others applying existing law. 
They aim at clear formulations of common law and its statutory ele-
46. Statement of Policy Establishing Criteria and Procedures for Designation and Consideration of 
Acts (January 13, 200 I), http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DestktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=3&tabid=42. 
47. ALI HANDBOOK, supra note 32, at 3. 
48. /d. at 4. 
49. /d. 
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ments or variations and reflect the law as it presently stands or might 
plausibly be stated by a court. Restatement black-letter formulations as-
sume the stance of describing the law as it is. 
Model codes or statutes and other statutory proposals are addressed main-
ly to legislatures, with a view toward legislative enactment. Statutory formu-
lations assume the stance of prescribing the law as it shall be. 
Principles may be addressed to courts, legislatures, or governmental agen-
cies. They assume the stance of expressing the law as it should be, which 
may or may not reflect the law as it is. 50 
The ALI recognizes the similarities among the three different types of 
projects. Each covers a particular area of law and synthesizes it in a way 
that leads to the "better administration of justice."51 All projects contain 
"black letter" legal statements with comments and illustrations. 52 According 
to the ALI, the projects differ in the "stance toward the law assumed," the 
legal institutions to which they relate, and their purposes. 53 
The distinctions are blurred in practice. Restatements can include existing 
law as found in existing state or federal codes and can be written as if they 
are statutes. They not only state the law as it exists, but also express changes 
in the law or suggest better common law rules that have not been adopted yet 
by courts. The ALI drafts model codes to be enacted by legislatures, but 
they usually involve a revision of an existing statutory framework rather 
than a creation of a completely new one. The content of the provisions in a 
model code are not substantially different from those in a Restatement or 
Principles. Principles can be addressed to the three branches of government 
to propose changes to existing law. Principles can include Restatement and 
model code provisions, but they need not be tied to existing law or represent 
incremental change from existing law. A Principles drafter is free to formu-
late the law as it should be. 54 
While more flexibility exists for a drafter of Principles, the composition of 
Restatements, model codes, and Principles are very similar. All can reflect 
proposed changes to existing law, all are written using similar formats, and 
all go through the same drafting and approval process. 
Given the similarities, the differences among them may largely be seman-
tic. For example, the reporter's Handbook offers Sec. 48 of the Restatement 
of Contracts, Second to highlight the differences between a Restatement, 
model law, and a Principle: "Death or Incapacity of Offeror or Offeree - an 
50. http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.main. Similar descriptions of the three types 
of projects are in ALI, HANDBOOK, supra note 32. 
51. ALI, HANDBOOK, supra note 32, at 3. 
52. !d. 
53. !d. at 4. 
54. See !d. at 3-14. 
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offeree's power of acceptance is terminated when the offeree or offeror dies 
or is deprived of legal capacity to enter into the proposed contract."55 
The phrase "is terminated" indicates the present tense of a Restatement 
expressing existing current law. Replacing the same phrase with "shall be 
terminated" indicates a statutory command, while "should be terminated" 
indicates a Principle or the way law should be, but does not currently exist. 56 
Given the similarities of the three formats, creating guidelines on how to 
choose which one to employ may mean no more than deciding which aux-
iliary verb to use. 
The differences between the three types of projects are meaningful in 
terms of limiting or expanding the scope of projects. Restatement and model 
law projects have existing law as a starting point. They are constrained, to 
an extent, by current law. Principle projects, while taking into account cur-
rent case and statutory law, can ignore that law if there are rules that make 
more sense. In other words, reporters of Restatements are restrained by the 
settled law that they seek to restate, but there are fewer constraints for the 
drafters of Principles because the existing law is unsettled. 
The area of law may also determine the type of project a reporter chooses. 
An area of law dominated by common law lends itself to a Restatement in 
the same manner that law governed by statutes requires a model code. With 
the growth of the regulatory state there are fewer areas of law that are either 
purely common or statutory law. Principles projects are better equipped to 
provide a complete solution to these complex areas oflaw. 
Articulating how the ALI determines the appropriate form for a project, 
Michael Traynor, a former president of the ALI, recently wrote that the dis-
tinctions among the various project forms as described in the Handbook 
were "pertinent" to the determination. 57 Echoing previous statements about 
the appropriateness of different project forms, Traynor reasons that estab-
lished and well-settled law is ripe for Restatement treatment, but lesser de-
veloped law may be better suited for Principles treatment. 58 
So how should an ALI reporter, director, or Council determine when to 
use one project format over another? Restatements can be employed in areas 
where there is settled common law. If common law is unsettled or bad law, 
then a model law or Principles format can be used. But how does one 
choose between the two? Obviously, model laws are purely statutory, whe-
reas Principles can be a combination of model statutes, Restatements of 
common law, and other standards. In the absence of explicit ALI guidelines, 
the necessity of using one format over another is still unclear. Only the 
Handbook and the statements made by the ALI directors, presidents, and 
55. ALI, HANDBOOK, supra note 32, at 6. 
56. !d. 
57. Michael Traynor, The First Restatements and the Vision of the American Law Institute, Then 
and Now, 32 S.lLL. U. L.J. 145, 160-61 (2007). 
58. !d. at 162. 
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reporters regarding existing projects provide some written guidance to future 
reporters, directors, and presidents. 
The ALI Council should consider developing criteria for the use of differ-
ent project forms just as NCCUSL has done with uniform and model laws. 
Having official criteria eliminates inconsistencies that can result from mak-
ing such decisions on an ad hoc basis. Official criteria will force the ALI to 
consider the purpose of their project forms and to decide whether those 
forms currently meet the goals ofthe organization and the needs of society. 
II. RECENT ANCIENT HISTORY 
Nearly fifteen years ago, the ALI and NCCUSL embarked on a project to 
revise Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. During the study phase 
of that project, it became clear that the shifting transactional landscape 
would render revision of Article 2 alone-at least Article 2 restricted to its 
original scope, the sale of goods--crucially deficient. That is, transactional 
patterns, urged on by evolving technologies, had obscured whatever good 
reason there may once have been for distinguishing sales of goods from oth-
er, analogous transactions. Indeed, the promulgation of Article 2A, govern-
ing leases of personal property, confirmed that essential Article 2 principles 
(even if not necessarily extant Article 2 formulations 59) could apply with 
similar vigor in analogous transactional contexts. 
Insofar as "the object of the Article 2 Revision Committee [was] to 
achieve symmetry and coordination within the commerciallaw,"60 there had 
to be good reason to limit the scope of a Revised Article 2 as severely as had 
been the original promulgation. The reasons for Original Article 2's scope 
limitation would have to be retested and justified once more, or, so it would 
seem, the limitation could not endure. And, of course, the promulgation of 
Article 2A confirmed that there was nothing necessary or inevitable about 
limiting the commercial contracting law to sales of goods rather than includ-
ing a wider sample of transactions. 
Fairly early on, the drafters of the Revision determined that the best way 
to accommodate the coordination of fundamental commercial contmcting 
principles and transactional idiosyncrasy was to adopt a "hub and spoke" 
approach: 
The hub and spoke approach assumes certain over-arching fundamental 
principles of commercial contra<:ts which are formulated as a 'hub.' 
From that hub emanates a series of 'spokes,' each pertaining to differ-
59. See, e.g., Peter A. Alces, Su"eptitious and not-so-Su"eptitious Adjustment of the UCC: An 
Introductory Essay, 39 ALA. L. REv. 559, 564-65, n.24 (1988) (observing that U.C.C. § 2A-201, pertain-
ing to the statute of frauds, "does not follow its Article 2 analogue .... ") (hereinafter Alces, Su"epti-
tious). 
60. Benfield, Jr. & Alces, Reinventing, supra note 5, at 1406. 
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ent and distinguishable species of transaction, each sufficiently distinct 
from the transactions covered by the other spokes to support separate 
treatment, and each sufficiently similar to the other spokes to warrant 
application of the same hub principles. The hub could consist of basic 
contract formation principles, such as a writing requirement, extrinsic 
evidence rules, and unconscionability. The spokes would concern top-
ics as broad as sales of intangible personal property, licenses of intel-
lectual property, and intellectual property service agreements. 61 
There certainly was at least superficial attraction to a method that would 
reconcile all that could be reconciled and draw distinctions that the law 
could just not do without. But when exposed to the harsh light of reality, 
and perhaps some cynicism, the potential flaws became manifest: "The hub 
and spoke approach ... will fragmentize the law, leaving it scattered among 
the special interests that certainly will undermine the hub (or hubs) by ad-
justment of the spokes, the patience of state legislatures willing. "62 
A hub and spoke approach would lead to the disintegration of commercial 
law, and would in fact undermine consistent principled treatment of recur-
ring transactions in recurring transactional contexts. Whether the distinc-
tions would be drawn along lines determined by the form of property (tangi-
ble versus intangible), transactor sophistication (merchant versus consumer), 
or transaction type (wholesale versus retail, service versus res), even sum-
mary consideration of the practicalities supported the conclusion that "the 
revisers' attraction to multiplication rather than consolidation ... avoided 
the focus on principle and fundamental affinities that should animate a com-
prehensive codification of the commercial law."63 The hub and spoke ap-
proach would have obscured principle, and would have actually undermined 
efforts to reveal the essential substance of the commercial contracting law. 
That would, in turn, have empowered special interests to prune the trees to 
their liking with no thought whatsoever of the forest. For those who think 
that there is something of fundamental concern that underlies commercial 
contracting, indeed perhaps all of contracting, hub and spoke would have 
been a giant leap backward in the commercial codification movement. 
To be fair, and perhaps more clear, it was not the slightest hint of "hub 
and spoke" that caused concern. After all, the current form of the U.C.C. 
might be understood as following the hub and spoke form. Article 1 con-
tains definitions64 and provisions65 of general application, and the substan-
tive articles that follow provide the rules governing specific transactional 
61. /d. 
62. /d. at 1409. 
63. /d. at 1414. 
64. See, e.g., the definition of"contract," U.C.C. § l-20l(b)(l2) (2003) (cross-referenced in Article 
2, U.C.C. § 2-102, Article 3, U.C.C. § 3-303, Article 7, U.C.C. § 7-102, etc.). 
65. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-304 (2001) (providing that every contract within the Uniform Commercial 
Code "imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement."). 
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contexts. But the division among the substantive articles of the current 
U.C.C. is the product of history more than anything else. That is, had the 
drafters of the U.C.C. begun from whole cloth it is not obvious that Article 1 
could not have been more extensive and the specific rules within each of the 
substantive rules more limited and focused. Indeed, it is clear that within 
each of the substantive articles as they currently exist, there could have been 
more specific spokes, thereby drawing distinctions provided or suggested in 
the current law.66 
In fact, the promulgation of Article 2A made quite clear the disintegration 
of principle that could (would inevitably?) attend the comprehensive execu-
tion of the hub and spoke strategy: "There are substantial similarities be-
tween a sale of goods and a lease of goods, nevertheless, only fifteen out of 
eighty-seven Article 2A sections are identical to those of Article 2."67 And 
the differences between Article 2 provisions and their Article 2A analogs are 
not consistently a function of transactional distinctions between a sale and a 
lease. 68 There are also examples among the other substantive articles of 
distinctions that do not obviously reflect transactional context as much as 
they do drafter and drafting inconsistency. 69 The failure of hub and spoke 
notwithstanding, there was a perceived need for legislation to govern evolv-
ing transactional patterns. Accordingly, it was clear that the fit between such 
legislation and extant commercial contracting law and principles would have 
to be reconceptualized. 
Ill. EXIT UCITA AND ENTER PRINCIPLES OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTING 
Following the failure of the hub and spoke initiative, the ALI and 
NCCUSL began work on an Article 2B of the U.C.C., which would have 
governed computer information transactions. 70 Dean (then Professor) Ray-
mond Nimmer was the Reporter for the project, which ultimately lost ALI 
66. Of course, to an extent, there are: see, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (2003) (applying a different Sta-
tute of Frauds requirement to merchants than non-merchants); U.C.C. Article 3 (2002) (employing differ-
ent contract rules for different forms of negotiable instruments); U.C.C. §§ 9-308-9-314 (2003) (basing 
form of perfection on type of collateral). 
67. Benfield, Jr. & Alces, Reinventing, supra note 5, at 1419. 
68. Alces, Surreptitious, supra note 59, at 564-65 n.24 (questioning the Official Comments to 
U.C.C. § 2A-201 explanation that the Article 2A statute of frauds provision contains no special rules for 
merchants, as does the Article 2 analogue, § 2-201(2), because "the number of such transactions involv-
ing leases ... was thought to be modest"); Benfield, Jr. & Alces, Reinventing, supra note 5, at 1421 
(explaining differences between Article 2 and 2A (e.g., battle of the forms, requirements for warranty of 
merchantability, and unconscionability) that do not arise out of the transactional differences between a 
sale and a lease). 
69. Benfield, Jr. & Alces, Reinventing, supra note 5, at 1428-29. 
70. Linda J. Rusch, A History and Perspective of Revised Article 2: The Never Ending Saga of a 
Search for Balance, 52 SMU L. REV. 1683, 1686-87 (1999) (noting that a NCCUSL drafting committee 
to address software transactions was born out ofNCCUSL leadership's 1995 decision that the hub and 
spoke concept was unworkable.). 
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co-sponsorship. 71 Unscathed, the NCCUSL continued with the project, de-
nominated the "Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act" (UCITA), 
until that too failed 72 after gaining passage in only two states and provoking 
a strong negative reaction from many of the other states that refused to even 
allow enforcement of contracts incorporating UCIT A within their jurisdic-
tions.73 
After the Article 2B and UCIT A projects, the perceived gap in the law 
that precipitated the effort to provide preemptive and comprehensive statuto-
ry law governing computer information transactions remained. Courts could 
rely on Articles 2 or 2A by analogy, 74 or fall back on common law contract-
ing principles such as those provided in the Contracts Restatement. But that 
was not, and is not, optimal, at least in the estimation of those uncomfortable 
with the uncertainty that might prevail during whatever amount of time it 
would take for the common law to catch up with the new transactional 
forms. 75 Of course, it will always be difficult to know when "it is time" for 
comprehensive codification of a new area of law, indeed, when a new area 
of law has in fact emerged. It is also likely that the affected transactors 
could disagree about the need for comprehensive codification: so long as 
courts are reaching conclusions with which you and similarly interested par-
ties are comfortable, all is well; but if courts are imposing risks on your 
business model that impair your investments' profitability, all is not so right 
with the world. 
The ALI concluded that, notwithstanding the dynamic nature of the law 
governing software transactions, the prominence of four unresolved issues, 
in particular, warranted reconsideration of the legal principles implicated: 
(1) the nature of software transactions; (2) the lawfulness of current 
practices of contract formation and the implications of these practices 
for determining governing terms; (3) the relationship between federal 
intellectual property law and private contracts governed by state law; 
71. See, e.g., The ALI Reporter (ALI Phila., Pa.), Spring 1999, at I. 
72. See Statement, K. King Burnett, Statement by NCCUSL President Burnett to ABA House of 
Delegates Regarding UCITA (Feb. 10, 2003), available at 
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl!ucita/UCIT A_ withdrawal. pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2009). 
73. "Bomb-shelter" legislation has been adopted in several states to prevent the enforcement of 
contracts incorporating UCITA. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 29-116 (WEST 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 554D.l25 (WEST 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 66-329 (WEST 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 
2463(a) (WEST 2008); W.VA. CODE. ANN.§ 55-8-15 (WEST 2008). 
74. See, e.g., Stanley A. Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F. Supp. 807, 809 (E.D. Pa. 1981) 
(adopting the general standard of good faith by analogizing the U.C.C. to a sale of franchise rights); 
Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 1370, 1375 (Mass. 1980) (applying, by analogy, the U.C.C. 
principles of good faith and unconscionability to a franchise agreement where the U.C.C. was otherwise 
inapplicable). 
75. Peter A. Alces, W(h)ither Warranty: The B(l)oom of Products Liability Theory in Cases of 
Deficient Software Design, 87 CAL. L. REv. 269,271-72 (1999) (hereinafter Alces, W(h)ither Warranty). 
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and (4) the appropriateness of contract terms concerning quality, reme-
dies, and other rights. 76 
Because transactions involving software present unique challenges, extant 
bodies of law are not sufficient to provide transactors the guidance they 
need. 77 And to the extent that formulation of essential principles can provide 
certainty, transaction costs are reduced, wealth and welfare are increased. 
That object is a worthwhile one and this article will not take issue with the 
reasons supporting the ALI's decision to go forward with the Principles of 
Software Contracting project. The concern we voice here is with the fit 
among the various statements and Restatements of law and legal Principles 
insofar as they erode the coherence of a body of law, such as Contract. We 
believe that there is both a reason for concern, and a different way to pro-
ceed that is considerate of the risks that the multiple iterations of "contract 
laws" present. It is worthwhile at the outset to offer a couple of concrete 
illustrations of the potential challenges. 
There has been a persistent tension in the commercial contracting law be-
tween the autonomy interests of those who sign consumer and commercial 
agreements and the utility to be realized from enforcement of such standard 
forms. 78 On the one hand, those who would be bound by what they sign 
want only to be bound to the extent that they intend to be bound. On the 
other hand, those who use form agreements want to be able to rely upon the 
enforceability of those forms even if they reflect something less than a "bar-
gain in fact." 79 The argument on the side of requiring substantial intent to be 
bound is the "agreement" requisite itself. While we probably do not require 
an absolute "meeting of the minds,''80 there is obvious good reason to want 
something more than an empty gesture. But that "something more" comes at 
a cost, and the question remains whether that agreement, or some reasonable 
76. Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, supra note 4, at Introduction. 
77. Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, supra note 4, at Introduction ("Software vendors 
and copyholders of all types can perform their various roles confidently and efficiently only after the 
clarification of applicable rules."). 
78. See, e.g., Peter A. Alces, Guerilla Terms, 56 EMORY L.J. 1511 (2007); Clayton P. Gillette, 
Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679 (2004); Russell Korobkin, Bounded 
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203 (2003); Jody S. 
Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The Vertical Integration Strategy, 11 
PHIL. ISSUES 420 (2001). 
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 3 (1981) ("An agreement is a manifestation of mu-
tual assent on the part of two or more persons. A bargain is an agreement to exchange promises or to 
exchange a promise for a performance or to exchange performances."). 
80. See, e.g., 216 Jamaica Ave., LLC v. S & R Playhouse Realty Co., 540 F.3d 433, 440 (6th Cir. 
2008) (''the meeting-of-the-minds formulation often requires far less than it suggests. As in most juris-
dictions, Ohio law does not require contracting parties to share a subjective meeting of the minds to 
establish a valid contract .... "). See also Booker v. Robert Half Int'l Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 94, 101 
(D.D.C. 2004) (holding that when a party signs an agreement they are presumed to know its contents); 
Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 522 (Va. 1954) (holding that ''the mental assent of the parties is not 
requisite for the formation of a contract. If the words or other acts of one of the parties have but one 
reasonable meaning, his undisclosed intention is immaterial .... "). 
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facsimile thereof, is ultimately worth the candle. Form agreements reduce 
transaction costs and thereby, 81 so the story goes, increase wealth and per-
haps welfare too, depending on what you understand welfare to be. 
The commentators have had a difficult time accommodating the autonomy 
interest vindicated by agreement with the welfare loss such actual agreement 
would entail. And it seems that there is more discussion about what the em-
pirical evidence would reveal than there is effort to develop that evidence. 82 
What is clear, though, is that there is nothing about the agreement calculus in 
the form contracting setting that is necessarily limited to transactions involv-
ing software, even if the complexity of some software transactions would 
suggest a basis of distinction. We may imagine that even a horse and buggy 
contract could be "complex," so long as we understand complexity, in this 
sense, to be a function of the contract price/allocation of risk calculus. 
The forthcoming Principles of the Law of Software Contracts suggests an 
accommodation of the conflicting interests that need not, at least need not 
obviously, be limited to the software contracting context. The Principles, as 
you recall, are the Institute's effort to pick up the thread left off in Article 2B 
and UCITA. UCITA was originally envisioned as Article 2B to the U.C.C., 
but later became a free-standing uniform law. Section 2.02 of the Principles 
is captioned "Standard-Form Transfers of Generally Available Software; 
Enforcement of the Standard Form" and bears reproduction at length here: 
(a) This Section applies to standard-form transfers of generally avail-
able software .... 
(b) A transferee adopts a standard form as a contract when a reasona-
ble transferor would believe the transferee intends to be bound to the 
form. 
(c) A transferee will be deemed to have adopted a standard form as a 
contract if 
(1) the standard form is reasonably accessible electronically prior 
to initiation of the transfer at issue; 
(2) upon initiating the transfer, the transferee has reasonable no-
tice of and access to the standard form before payment or, if there 
is no payment, before completion of the transfer; 
(3) in the case of an electronic transfer of software, the transferee 
signifies agreement at the end of or adjacent to the electronic stan-
81. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996). 
82. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. 
REv. 803 (2008); Oren Barr-Gill, Exchange, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 
MINN. L. REv. 749 (2008); Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and Market Cor-
rections, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. Ill (2006) (hereinafter Epstein, Behavioral Economics). 
HeinOnline -- 11 Duq. Bus. L.J. 213 2008-2009
2009 Is it Time for the Restatement of Contracts, Fourth? 
dard form, or in the case of a standard form printed on or attached 
to packaged software or separately wrapped from the software, the 
transferee does not return the software unopened within a reason-
able time after the transfer; and 
(4) the transferee can store and reproduce a standard form if pre-
sented electronically. 
213 
(d) Subject to § 1.10 (public policy), § 1.11 (unconscionability), and 
other validating defenses supplied by these Principles or outside law, a 
standard term is enforceable if reasonably comprehensible. 
(e) If the transferee asserts that it did not adopt a standard form as a 
contract under subsection (b) or asserts a failure of the transferor to 
comply with subsection (c) or (d), the transferor has the burden of pro-
duction and persuasion on the issue of compliance with the subsec-
tions. 83 
The section provides an alternative safe harbor, of sorts: "failure to comp-
ly does not absolutely bar a transferor from otherwise proving transferee 
assent."84 The apposite comments explain that the provision would apply to 
all transferees whether business (large or small) or consumer: "drawing lines 
between what constitutes a large or small business or between businesses in 
the same position as consumers and businesses with a better bargaining posi-
tion would be difficult and largely arbitrary. " 85 The drafters of the Software 
Principles seem to suggest that their object is deontological: "Increasing the 
opportunity to read supports autonomy reasons for enforcing software stan-
dard forms .... " 86 It is not, though, so clear that the provision relies on 
deontological rather than consequentialist premises. The focus is not on the 
particular transferee, but is instead on whether the standard term is reasona-
bly comprehensible. So, such a term will bind the transferee even in the 
absence of actual agreement. This provision, then, represents a departure 
from the traditional agreement conception and seems to defer to the type of 
market forces Judge Easterbrook87 and Professor Epstein 88 trust, while af-
fording somewhat less attention to the concerns raised by others. 
Another, and perhaps equally fundamental, crux in contracting law in-
volves the admissibility of extrinsic evidence when the parties have reduced 
their agreement to tangible form--the so-called "parol evidence rule. " 89 The 
83. Epstein, Behavioral Economics, supra note 82, at 163-64. 
84. /d. cmt. c, at 171. 
85. /d. at 165. 
86. /d. at 159. 
87. See, e.g., ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453. 
88. See, e.g., Epstein, Behavioral Economics, supra note 82, at 131. 
89. The common law, the Uniform Commercial Code, and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
contain differing but essentially similar renditions of the parol evidence rule. See, e.g., Shultz v. Delta-
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rule has assumed various formulations, both in the statutory commercial 
law90 and in the common law decisions. Further, even commentators who 
proceed from a consequentialist perspective acknowledge that there may be 
good consequentialist reasons for the rule to mean different things in differ-
ent contexts. 91 Interestingly, the most recent iteration of the ALI's Prin-
ciples of the Law of Software Contracts includes a provision which would 
provide a parol evidence rule to govern software contracts irrespective of the 
relative sophistication of the contracting parties: 
(d) The court should determine whether a term in a record is ambiguous 
.... In making this determination, the court should consider all credi-
ble and relevant extrinsic evidence, including evidence of agreements 
and negotiations prior to or contemporaneous with the adoption of the 
record. If a term or terms is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is admissible 
to prove the meaning of the term or terms. 92 
Now there may well be reason to distinguish software contracting from 
contracting about other forms of property that militates in favor of a particu-
lar predisposition toward the introduction of extrinsic evidence in the soft-
ware contracting setting. Certainly the complexity of software contracts, at 
least until they have become more familiar and standardized, 93 could matter 
to the law's attitude toward such evidence. A challenge that should remain 
for the ALI and the Reporters of the Software Principles will be to offer 
Rail Corp., 508 N.E.2d 1143, 1150 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (slating that "[a]n agreement reduced to writing 
must be presumed to speak the intention of the parties who signed it. The intention with which it was 
executed must be determined from the language used, and such an agreement is not to be changed by 
extrinsic evidence."); 67 Wall St. Co. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 333 N.E.2d 184, 186 (N.Y. 1975) (recog-
nizing that the parol evidence rule in New York "requires the exclusion of evidence of conversations, 
negotiations and agreements made prior to or contemporaneous with the execution of a written lease 
which may tend to vary or contradict its terms ... "); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 
(1981). 
90. U.C.C. § 2-202 (2003); U.C.C. § 2A-202 (2003). 
91. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits af Contract Law, 
113 YALE L.J. 541, 547 (2003) (concluding that a "textualist theory of interprelation, however, will not 
suit all parties all of the time. Therefore, courts should use narrow evidentiary bases when interpreting 
agreements between firms, but also should comply with party requests to broaden the base that is applica-
ble to them.") (hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory). 
92. Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, supra note 4, at § 3.08(d). On the question of 
whether even business transactors are subject to the same negotiating pressures as consumers, see gener-
ally Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False Dichotomies of Contract Law, 40 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 295 (2005) and Omri Ben-Shahar & James J. White, Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto 
Manufacturing Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2006). For the argument that the computer software 
context presents particular opportunities for overreaching, see Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Setting 
Software Defaults: Perspective from Law, Computer Science and Behavioral Economics, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REv. 583 (2006) and Nim Razook, The Politics and Promise ofUCITA, 36 CREIGHTON L. REv. 
643 (2003). 
93. See, e.g., Alces, W{h}ilher Warranty, supra note 75, at 271-72 ("Because the technology that a 
uniform software license Jaw would govern has not reached anything even approaching repose, it is 
impossible to draft a U.C.C. software article in the best Llewellynesque tradition."). 
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convincing arguments to distinguish the software contracting setting from 
other transactional contexts. 94 
IV. ARE PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACTING POSSIBLE? 
It is difficult to make much sense of the categories that the ALI has 
adopted to distinguish its various legal reform initiatives. While there might 
be good reason to understand that Restatements capture what the law dec-
lares itself to be, uniform laws prescribe what the law is, and Principles more 
candidly urge the law in some direction, it is very clear that the province of 
those three project categories are not discrete; in fact, they very obviously 
do, and indeed should, overlap. Why would we not want the law to aspire to 
be better than it is? Why would we want the keepers of the law's flame to 
settle for the status quo? Insofar as there is something necessarily aspira-
tional about all three types of projects, we are not surprised that the province 
of each cannot remain discrete. We do not think that it would serve the 
noble objectives of the Institute were each of its projects and products not 
aspirational in just the way that the descriptions of each type suggest. To 
restate the law is to read it in light of its best interpretation;95 to certainly 
provide the law is to draw on what practice has revealed; and to offer fun-
damental principles you necessarily mine the legal landscape in order to 
discover what should be discovered and bury what should be buried. We are 
simply not convinced that the categories have the intellectual integrity to 
which they would seem to aspire. There is more that brings them together 
than there is to distinguish them, and that is as it should be. 
But we believe that there is more important work for the Institute (and 
perhaps even NCCUSL, in some way) to do than it has been doing. We be-
lieve that the Institute, despite an inclination to do so obscured by the project 
labels, has not moved ambitiously enough beyond the objectives of its origi-
nal founders. While the original Restatement projects may well have done 
what was mid-Twentieth Century legal rocket science-collected in one 
manageable place the best understanding of discrete areas of law-the or-
ganization has come to a crossroads and must respond to Twenty First Cen-
tury challenges to law and legal theory. That is, the Institute must more 
carefully delineate the object of its different project types and understand 
94. See Memorandum to Reporters, Director, Advisors, Consultative Group Members and Member 
of the Institute, from Micalyn S. Harris, May 16, 2008, re: Principles of the Law of Software Contracts -
Comments on Discussion Draft of March 24, 2008 (arguing that the Institute has not demonstrated ''why 
general contract principles are or should be inapplicable to contracts involving software") (on file with 
author). See also, Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Elec-
tronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 495 (2002) (concluding that "existing contract law is up to the chal-
lenge" of regulating contracting in an electronic environment.). 
95. This is the interpretive theory, generally, and a Dworkinian idea, specifically; see, e.g. STEPHEN 
A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 5 (2004) (interpretive theory "helps to 'make sense' of the law-and 
thereby helps us better understand it."). 
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Principles projects as efforts to come to terms with the fundamental issues. 
In the case of commercial contracting, the Institute must try to do the fun-
damental research to help us better understand what theory of contract works 
or, if none does, what theory or theories explains the fit among the various 
contestants. 96 The ALI has continued to assemble cars when it needs to go 
back and discover what should replace the internal combustion engine. 
That is not work for the faint of heart or even for the conscientious student 
of case law alone. Contract is more than case law, and in some important 
way it may even be less than case law. We need the talent, and the unique 
perspective, of the American Law Institute to help us resolve the fundamen-
tal deontological and consequentialist tensions. While the original Restate-
ments may have filled a gap in the literature, advances in legal research 
techniques and technologies have accomplished what the Restatements en-
deavored to accomplish. The ALI can and must now do more than it has 
tried to do before, and the work will likely be more difficult. 
The failure of the Article 2 revisions projects provides an opportunity for 
the ALI to reinvent itself. The organization, with or without the aid of 
NCCUSL, should begin a new project, and not a Restatement of Contracts, 
Fourth. The ALI membership should confront the challenge that the contract 
law presents by reconsidering its mission. In order to remain at the forefront 
of contract law reform, the ALI should begin a comprehensive review of the 
case law and commentary to identify the foundation of the consensual under-
taking in terms that could, and would, resonate through myriad contract con-
texts. A piecemeal approach to systemic conundrums is not sufficient, even 
if it has been, and at the outset might be, necessary. 
96. Deontological theories generally focus on Kantian notions of autonomy. The most prominent 
would be CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE {1981). More recent iterations of the contract as 
promise perspective are found in DoRI KiMEL, FROM CONTRACT TO PROMISE (2003); Seana Valentine 
Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REv. 708 (2007); and Daniel Markovits, 
Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L. J. 1417 (2004). Consequentialist theories generally focus on 
transaction cost reduction or welfare maximization as the object of exchange transactions. See, e.g., 
Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 91; Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and 
the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REv. 489 (1989). 
